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1Effectiveness and effects of attempts to regulate the UK petrol
industry.
This paper evaluates the impact that investigation and regulation of the UK
petrol industry has had on the profitability of the companies. Using a gross margin for
petrol, we estimate a series of variable parameter autoregressive processes. The
results demonstrate that the 1979 Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigation
into the industry, caused a long term decline in profit margins in the industry, despite
the fact that no recommendations or undertakings were made. This cannot however be
said for subsequent investigations.
Nigel Driffield & Chris Ioannidis,
Cardiff Business School.
JEL Classification : L10, L51.
2Introduction
The petrol industry is one of the most investigated industries in the UK. It  has
experienced in the past twenty years, two Monopolies and Mergers Commission
industry investigations, and two investigations by the House of Commons Trade and
Industry Select Committee (1988a, 1988b). In all of the investigations since 1979, the
various committees have found that while the industry is a ‘complex monopoly’, there
is nothing evident in the industry’s conduct that is against the public interest.
This paper will focus on the impact on the gross margin of main investigations
into the industry, the two MMC enquires, MMC(1979, 1990). These investigations
have essentially been concerned with the oligopolistic nature of the petrol industry,
and the possible anticompetitive effects. However, the only outcome of these has been
for the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to ‘keep the industry under review’. This is
despite the fact that the industry has many characteristics which are associated with
anticompetitive conduct and monopoly rents. Indeed, the OFT have recently
published a report into the supply of petrol, arguing that there is no case for a re-
referral to the MMC.1
Section one is concerned with a description of why monopoly profits are
possible in the petrol industry. Section two outlines the investigations that have been
carried out into the potential for monopoly abuse, and section three focuses on the
impact of the investigations on the profit margin. Section four outlines the procedures
used in the analysis, while sections five and six present the results and conclusions.
31 Oligopoly in the UK petrol market
The five firm concentration ratio was above 70% for the whole of the period
1973-1993, and as such, the likelihood of monopoly pricing in the industry is high.
The MMC (1990) reports that there is very little variation in price across firms, and
the market shares of the five leading companies have been very stable over time.
Further, there is significant evidence of sticky pricing in petrol, Bacon (1992).
Borenstein et al (1997) show that retail petrol prices in the US, respond faster to oil
price increases than they do to oil price falls. They attribute this to asymmetry in the
costs of inventory adjustment, but also possibly to the oligopolistic nature of the
industry.
1.1 Vertical Restraints in Petrol Supply
The MMC determined in 1979 that the industry was a ‘complex monopoly’ in
favour of the major firms, as a result of vertical restraints. The most obvious
efficiency explanation for vertical restraints or vertical integration in the petrol
industry is the ‘double marginalisation’ principle. The industry has however never
used this argument, denying that upstream monopoly power exists. In submissions to
the MMC (1990), the large petrol companies have employed the ‘Chicago School’
argument, see for example Bork (1978), or Posner (1981), to defend their position.
One of the most powerful arguments in favour of permitting the vertical relations in
the petrol industry, is put forward by Dobson & Waterson (1996). They suggest that
as there are no economies of scope in petrol retailing, the stance taken by the MMC,
to view these arrangements as not against the public interest is a fair one.
4Vickers and Waterson (1991) discuss the general effects of vertical restraints,
many of which are applicable to the petrol industry. Vertical restraints, are employed
to remove inter-brand competition at the retail level, while the petrol companies
ensure through their licensing of sites that there is little intra-brand competition. Slade
(1993) demonstrates a similar result in a study of petrol retailing in Vancouver. While
it would appear to be the case that oil companies gain from these arrangements, the
extent to which the retailers gain, is a function of local market conditions.
1.2 Price Discrimination
The petrol companies utilise the system of  Selective Price Support. Under
these agreements, wholesalers provide retailers with discounted prices, in locations
where they face significant inter-brand competition. Gupta et al (1994) show that
under these conditions, spatial price discrimination will serve to increase monopoly
profits, while Armstrong & Vickers (1993) show that, when used to protect certain
markets, such price discrimination can form a significant barrier to entry.
1.3 Empirical evidence of Pricing and Oligopolistic Interaction in the petrol
Industry
Much of the work carried out in this area focuses on petrol pricing within an
oligopolistic market in North America, see for example, Slade (1990, 1992, 1993) and
Borenstein & Shepard (1996). Borenstein & Shepard (1996) for example, report
significant evidence of tacit collusion between petrol retailers, based on a standard
model of petrol prices. However, due to the extensive vertical links in the UK
industry, it is necessary to focus the analysis on the conduct of petrol companies, and
as such interpretation of more aggregate margins is necessary.
52. Investigation into the UK petrol industry
2.1 1979 Monopolies and Mergers Commission Investigation
The main mechanism for the implementation of UK competition policy, has
been based on the 1978 Fair Trade Act, which replaced the 1948 FTA. Under this act,
the OFT referred any industry for investigation by the MMC, if it suspected conduct
which may be against the public interest.2 The 1979 MMC investigation concluded
that a ‘complex monopoly’ existed in favour of the petrol companies (there are 15
companies listed in the report). That is to say that “one or more of the companies ....
conduct their respective affairs by means of one or more specified practices as in any
way to prevent, restrict or distort competition” (MMC, 1979, pp 49)3. The areas of
concern were the discriminatory pricing, through the system of rebates, and Selective
Price Support. However, in spite of this, the MMC took the view that the actions of
the companies in this respect were not against the public interest, and as such should
be permitted. 
The MMC also took the view that price competition in the petrol market had
increased in the years leading up to the report, and as such there was little evidence of
monopoly pricing. The MMC made no attempt however, to analyse the profitability
of the petrol industry, or the return on capital for any of the leading firms. With the
exception of the issues concerning price discrimination, the MMC made no comment
on the pricing policies of the firms.
2.2 Price commission investigations.
Over the same period however, the four leading firms in the industry (Esso,
Shell, BP, Texaco) came under the jurisdiction of the Price Commission, and the
6Counter-Inflation Act (1973), and the Price Commission Act (1979). As such, any
price increases by the firms had to be approved by the Price Commission, following
an investigation. This took place during the period of rapid oil price increases of 1979
(see figure 1), and as a result, the companies were allowed two successive price rises,
early in 1979, amounting to just under 12%. While there is no evidence that these
price rises were designed to increase profitability above the 1978 level, it is clear that
such an outcome will have had a positive impact on the profit margins of the
companies concerned. 
2.3 Subsequent Investigations and Regulation.
Partly as a result of the MMC investigation, the Price Marking (petrol) Order
came into operation in January 1981. This was a statuary instrument, ordered by the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. This was introduced to ensure that prices
were displayed in gallons as well as litres, as litres were viewed at the time to be
misleading. As such, displaying prices in the more ‘transparent’ pence per gallon, was
viewed as facilitating greater competition. This has since been superseded by
European regulations, concerning the pricing of goods in metric units.
In addition to general competition policy, the UK petrol industry has also
fallen under the scrutiny of the House of Commons Trade and Industry Select
Committee. There have been two investigations by this group of MPs into petrol
retailing, essentially concerning the prospects for price discrimination within the
industry. 
The Committee’s concerns surrounded price differences over small distances,
supported through the Selective Price Support system. The investigation carried out
by the House of Commons Trade & Industry Select Committee (1988a) took the view
7that intra-firm price differences provided evidence of some monopoly pricing in
particular locations. They concluded however, that this was an extremely complex
issue, and recommended a reference to the MMC. While the powers of the Trade and
Industry select committee are somewhat limited in themselves, and as such one would
not anticipate a change in conduct of the companies during such an investigation, it is
clear from the MMC report, that the select committee were instrumental in bringing
about the 1990 MMC referral. Indeed, the select committee were strongly critical of
the OFT’s failure to bring about a suitable change in conduct, and therefore
profitability.
2.2 The 1990 MMC Investigation
In contrast with the previous report, the 1990 investigation discusses pricing
of petrol at length. The commission found that pump prices follow the Rotterdam spot
price, and that there was little reason to assume monopoly profits in the industry. The
analysis employed by the MMC however is somewhat simplistic, and several of their
conclusions have however been questioned. Bacon (1991) for example demonstrates
that petrol price responses to oil price changes are asymmetric.
Despite this evidence of monopoly behaviour, there are several explanations
why the commission again came to the conclusion that the conduct of the petrol
companies was not against the public interest. Much of the reasoning was based on
the increasing market share of supermarkets in petrol retailing, acting to increase
competition. However, by 1988 the share of the market controlled by supermarkets,
had only increased to 5.5%, while sites directly controlled by wholesalers still
accounted for 54%. 
83. The Impact of Investigations
Following the above discussion, and the empirical work by Bacon (1992) and
Driffield (1999), a two part hypothesis can be formed. Firstly, that petrol companies
were able to generate some monopoly rents over at least a part of the period.
Secondly, that the investigations, and subsequent regulation had an impact on profit
margins. One possibility is that these firms were engaging in monopoly pricing, and
amended their conduct as a result of the threat of action by the MMC. This would be
particularly pertinent to the 1979 investigation, as there had been significant criticism
of the industry following the 1975 oil price shock.
3.1 The Data4
 The data used here are monthly from May 1973 to April 1993. The net petrol
price is retail price minus excise duty and VAT, while the oil price is the sterling
equivalent price of a gallon of oil. 5 
3.2 Analysis of the profit margin.
As the structure of the industry is transparent, with high concentration ratios,
many of the investigations outlined above, such as the MMC inquiries, the Price
Commission reports, and indeed the 1998 OFT report into the petrol industry, have
tended to rely on accounting based measures of performance in order to infer the
conduct of the industry. The use for example of return on capital employed to infer
industry conduct, is likely to generate misleading conclusions, due to the well-known
problems with reliability of accounting measures of profit.
9As can be seen from figure 1, both the retail price of petrol, and the oil price
have been somewhat volatile over the time period, and so to focus on whether petrol
prices are ‘too high’, as the Trade and Industry select committee did, for example,
would be equally misleading. 
Insert figure 1 here. 6
This paper therefore focuses on a measure of the profit ‘margin’ that petrol
companies generate on a gallon of petrol. This allows explicit evaluation of the
impacts of the reports and investigations outlined in section 2. If the companies were
generating monopoly rents, then clearly the fundamental role of the many
investigators and regulators in this industry, should be to reduce this margin.
Following Driffield (1999), the major determinants of petrol price are oil
price, excise duty, and the sterling dollar exchange rate. We therefore calculate a
margin for the petrol companies, given by :
φ = net retail petrol price - oil price (expressed in £/ gallon)
The discussion of the impact of regulation on conduct and performance in the
petrol industry, now focuses on this margin. We first present some graphical evidence
based on the decomposition of the margin into a flexible trend, which captures
fluctuations in low frequencies and cyclical and other high frequency random
fluctuations. The Hodrick-Prescott filter, Hodrick et al (1984)  allows the data to
determine this trend by splitting the series { }φ( )t tT=1  into two parts ,
{ }s t tT( ) =1  and { }φ( ) ( )t s t tT− =1  in a way that it minimises the following criterion
function :
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where λ > 0 penalises fluctuations of the trend series { }s t( )
The usual value for this parameter using monthly data is 14400, larger value
of λ will result in a smoother trend.
Insert figure 2 here
Figure 2 illustrates the ‘raw’ margin data, and the smoothed data using the
filter. The shaded periods are the times between the announcements of MMC
enquiries, and the completion of the report. In both cases, it is clear that the “trend” in
petrol margins declined as soon as an enquiry was announced. This therefore
tentatively suggests that the petrol companies modified their behaviour once an
investigation was announced.
While this provides an interesting illustration of the impact of the MMC on
conduct, this is not sufficient to demonstrate that profit margins were abnormally
high, as it is necessary to focus on the long run changes in the margin.
4. Investigations and changes in the petrol margin.
As noted above, there have been several regulatory measures which have may
have impacted on the profitability of the petrol company. The issue here, is not
merely whether the judgements of the investigators changed the conduct of the firms,
but whether conduct changed beyond the duration of the investigation. As illustrated
above, any such shift in industry conduct is likely therefore to persist after the
investigation is completed.
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In a general sense, the problem of determining the impact of the investigation,
can be defined as follows : suppose a stationary time series is generated by an
autoregressive process. Define a ‘break’ in the series as a shift in the mean value
which corresponds to a change in the intercept of the autoregressive process. The
question is how does one determine whether such breaks occur and if so where they
occur. A subsequent question is to what extent these breaks are long  or short lasting. 
Consider the regression:
p(t) = a0+A(L)p(t-1)+u(t) 
where p(t) is the variable of interest, a0 is the constant term A(L) is a
polynomial in the lag operator and u(t) is a white noise error term. Define the dummy
variable D(st) =1 if the date is “on or after date s” (when the event occurs), and zero
otherwise.
Conventionally, dummy variables are used to augment the regression
p(t)=a0+A(L)p(t-1)+bsD(st)+u(t)
In effect then bs is measuring the magnitude of the hypothesised mean change
that occurred in date s .
However when there are several such breaks that may counteract each other
the parameter vector bs will not be precisely estimated, and furthermore the
secondary question of whether the break persisted into the long term cannot be
adequately answered. 
To avoid such problems Willard et al. (1996) follow a procedure suggested by
Banerjee et al. (1992) which mimics that of Hamilton (1989) although is
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computationally less cumbersome. The procedure estimates by a series of
autoregressive processes using a rolling regression (of fixed window) and sequentially
tests for the significance of the coefficient of the dummy variable. When the
hypothesis is strongly rejected, one is able to identify the period of break, and using
the ‘latest’ estimated parameters estimate the short and long run change in the mean
of the series due to the event. By estimating a series of rolling regression this
approach implies that both the constant term and the autoregressive parameters also
change over time, and in addition the results will be conditioned on the window
length. 
Here we develop a similar approach that a) takes into account explicitly the
possibility of the moving parameters and b) is independent of the arbitrarily chosen
window length  used in the rolling regressions. 
We estimate the autoregressive process by a Kalman filter algorithm , thus the
parameters are updated as to produce optimal forecasts, we then use the state vector to
test whether its observed variability can be accounted by the presupposed events.
Having taken into account the coefficient’s inertia we are then able to estimate the
persistence of  the break on the intercept. 
This analysis involves the use of a Kalman filter to analyse the movements in
our margin.
4.1 Kalman Filter Analysis.
State-space form
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Following Hamilton (1994) the vector of the observed variables at time t, φ t, is
related to the vector of betas, known as the ‘state vector’, via the measurement
equation.
φ t = Ιt + ϑt * φ t-1+ Μt (5)
where E(Μt) = 0  and  var(Μt) = Ht 
The elements of the state vector are generally not observable but they are assumed to
follow a first-order Markov process. This is incorporated in the transition equation.
ϑt = Tt * ϑt-1 + Οt (6)
where Tt is a square matrix
E(Οt) = 0  and  var(Οt) = Qt
To complete the specification of the state-space system two further assumptions are
made.
• the initial state vector has a mean of b0 and a covariance matrix of Po
 thus   ϑ0 ~ N(b0, Po)
• the disturbances Οt and Μt are uncorrelated with each other across all time periods,
and uncorrelated with the initial state
E(Μt,Οt) = 0 E(Μt,b0) = 0 E(Οt,b0) = 0
The matrices in the measurement and in the transition equations are assumed
to be nonstochastic. Although they may change with time, these variations are
predetermined. If we fix Tt over time, the transition equation becomes a first-order
autoregressive process. Hence, the parameter beta is not constrained to having a fixed
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mean but is allowed to vary over time. These variations are determined by the statistic
Qt.
Once the model has been formulated in state-space form, various algorithms
may be applied. The main one is the Kalman filter which is a recursive procedure for
calculating the optimal estimator of the state vector given, all of the information
which is currently obtainable. A backward recursion, known as smoothing, is also
available. It enables optimal estimation of the state vector’s components to be
calculated at all points in time, using the full sample of information accessible. Given
the information on the dependent variable, φ t, Kalman filter recursions are applied in
three distinct stages. First, from the initial estimate of beta at time t-1, bt-1, and its
covariance matrix Pt-1 prediction equations are derived that will provide the optimal
estimator of the state vector ϑt by minimum mean square linear estimation. The
prediction equations are : 
bt / t-1 = bt-1
pt / t-1 = pt-1 + Qt
The corresponding estimator of the dependent variable is : 
φ t  / t-1 = φ t -1 * bt / t-1 (7)
Thus, the error made in predicting the minimum mean square linear estimation at time
t-1 is :
Υt = φ t - φ t / t-1
    = φ t -1 *(ϑt - bt / t-1) + Μt (8)
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In a second stage the estimator of the state vector can be updated once additional
information becomes available. The corresponding updating equation is :
t
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where Ht is the covariance matrix of the error term of the measurement equation.
The gain from the Kalman procedure is :
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The prediction error plays a key role in the updating. The more the predictor
of observation deviates from its realisation, the bigger the change made to the
estimator of the state vector.
Finally, smoothing equations are initiated to essentially reverse the filtering
process. The fixed-interval smoothing algorithm consists of a set of recursions which
start with the final quantities, bT and PT, given the Kalman filter and work backwards.
The smoothing equations are :
bt / T = bt + P’t * (bt+1 / T - bt) (10)
Pt / T = Pt + P’t * (Pt+1 / T - Pt+1 / t) * P’t (11)
where P’t = Pt * P-1t+1 / t t = T-1, T-2,.....,1
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In the end the Kalman filter will provide an estimated value adjustment
coefficient for each time period. The resulting series can subsequently be used to test
the beta parameter’s stationarity.
The essential advantage of this process, is that it allows for the continual
updating of parameters as more information becomes available. Slade (1989) for
example demonstrates the gain from this procedure in modelling price wars. In the
case presented here however, rather than the companies updating their information on
the demand equation, they are effectively updating their supply behaviour based on
anticipated regulatory action. The use of the Kalman filter therefore allows for the
presence of an autoregressive process in the parameters. This therefore allows the
impact of any change due to regulation to be carried beyond the period of regulation.
Thus, if there is an exogenous factor which acts to change the margin, the influence of
this factor will continue beyond the period of the shock.
The process here uses an expression for the margin, φt :
φt = αt + β1t*φt-1+ β2t*φt-2 + ut (12)
The Kalman filter is applied to this, to extract α, which is the ‘long run’
margin. This however is not merely a fixed coefficient, as the Kalman filter technique
continually updates it given new information. It is then possible to test the extent to
which exogenous influences impact on this long run margin. 
Thus, the final expression which is used to evaluate the long run impact of
investigation or regulation is :
$α t = c + c1* $α t-1+ j=∑ 27 cj*Dj-1 +εt (13)
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where D is the set of dummy intervention variables given above.
The possible causes of changes in the margin are as follows :
D1 =1 for the duration of the 1979 MMC report.
D2 =1 for the duration between the publication of the report and any decision 
made by the Secretary of State.
D3, D4 as above for the 1990 report.
D5 the duration of the Trade & Industry Select Committee investigation.
D6 = 1 for the duration of the imposition of the Petrol Price Marking Order.
Given the very nature of $α t variable, this a very rigorous test of the long run
impact of intervention. The results from the estimation of equation (13) by OLS are
given in table 1 :
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5. Results
table 1 here
The results here show clearly that the instigation of the 1979 MMC inquiry
had a significant negative effect on the margins of the petrol companies. This result
would appear to contradict the MMC, that the petrol companies were not generating
monopoly profits, as the companies responded to the announcement of the
investigation by reducing their margins. All other investigations, or attempts at
regulation, such as the Marking Order, have been ineffective at reducing profitability.
The instigation of the second report did not have similar effect on profitability. This is
the expected result. The MMC had already given the industry a favourable verdict in
1979, so the industry had little treason to suppose that its conduct would be found to
be against the public interest the second time.
As this paper demonstrates, the 1979 investigation therefore changed the
conduct of the oil companies in the long term, such that margins were reduced. As
such therefore, given the previous findings of the MMC, there was little reason for the
companies to anticipate an adverse finding eleven years on. Finally, concerning the
deliberations of the MMC in general, Clarke et al. (1998) report that the likelihood of
an industry being found to be not acting against the public interest has significantly
increased since 1979. In addition, there is significant evidence that firms involved in
more than one investigation learn a good deal from the experience in terms of how to
put their case to the commission, and in subsequent investigations hire specialists, and
employ much higher levels of resources in producing their submissions than the first
time, thus increasing their chance of ‘success’.
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6. Conclusions.
This paper demonstrates that the regulatory bodies in the UK inadvertently
had a significant effect on consumption efficiency within the petrol industry. This is
despite the fact that the industry has never been found to be acting against the public
interest. 
There are many reasons to believe that this industry may behave as a collusive
oligopoly, and there is significant evidence of restrictive practices in the industry.
Intra-brand competition is all but negated by the petrol companies, and horizontal
restrictions act to severely limit inter-brand competition. While it is impossible to
prove monopoly pricing on the part of the petrol companies, certain conclusions can
be inferred. The threat of an adverse report, or government regulation of the petrol
industry, was sufficient to change the conduct of the companies. This had the effect of
reducing profit margins from 1977 onwards. There is also evidence that this effect
persisted after the publication of the report. Finally, there is no evidence that any
subsequent investigations have been as effective.
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Appendix : Unit root tests on the profit margin.
Unit root tests: Phillips - Perron test statistics. 
No of lags 0 1 2 3 4
Test Stat. -23.98 -25.96 -26.25 -26.92 -26.95
P-value 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
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Table 1 : Determinants of the gross margin.
Dependent variable : $α t
Estimated
Variable Coefficient t-statistic P-value
constant 0.528 6.42** [0.000]
$α t-1 0.676 14.22** [0.000]
D1 -0.137 -2.23** [0.026]
D2 -0.058 -0.62 [0.539]
D3 -0.102 -1.19 [0.236]
D4 0.097 0.98 [0.326]
D5 -0.029 -0.22 [0.827]
D6 0.099 0.81 [0.418]
** significant at the 95% level.
Mean of dependent variable = 1.603 Std. dev. of dependent var. = 0.4708
Sum of squared residuals = 22.76 Variance of residuals = 0.099
Std. error of regression = 0.3139
R-squared = 0.568 Adjusted R-squared = 0.556
Durbin’s h = 0.096 [p=0.923] Durbin’s h alternative = 0.288 [p=0.773]
Breusch/Godfrey LM: AR/MA1 = 0.0831 [p=0.773]
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Figure 1.
Oil spot price and net retail petrol price
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Figure 2. 
The raw margin, and the smoothed margin from the HP filter.
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